Border Force Inspection Report on Clandestine Entrants
This inspection examined the Border Force operation to deter and detect clandestine entrants at the juxtaposed controls in northern France (Calais, Coquelles, and Dunkerque), focusing on how efficiently and effectively staff resources and detection techniques are used and on Border Force’s engagement with security contractors, port and transport operators, and the French authorities.
Over the course of the last decade, the UK government has contributed hundreds of millions of pounds towards the strengthening of security measures in northern France with the aim of preventing migrants from entering the UK illegally. Since 2020, spending has been focused on combating ‘small boat’ crossings. Prior to that, the emphasis had been on improving the physical security measures at the juxtaposed ports, including through the installation of many miles of fencing on the approach roads. This has made incursions into the ports and clandestine entry by concealment in vehicles much more difficult, which many argue is the reason why the small boat crossings began.
It is clear that the numbers of clandestine entrants detected at Calais, Coquelles, and Dunkerque have fallen substantially. In 2016, there were over 56,000. In 2024, there were around 5,000. However, the relationship between small boats and clandestine entry through the juxtaposed ports is not well understood. This needs more attention, not least to get ahead of any displacement effect if new measures to reduce small boat crossings begin to work.
Meanwhile, this inspection has shown that the threat of clandestine entry at the juxtaposed ports remains high and is unrelenting, both from organised facilitations and from opportunistic ‘jump-ups’. Border Force resources and capabilities are stretched, and its operations and those of its security contractors are closely monitored by migrants and by smuggling gangs to identify and be ready to exploit any weaknesses. It is therefore vital that Border Force continues to invest in staff, detection equipment and IT systems at the juxtaposed ports. To do so with confidence that it is investing in the right places, it needs to record and analyse what is working and where the gaps are much more systematically than is currently the case.
One of the measures employed to deter clandestine entry is a penalty scheme that enables Border Force to levy fines on anyone found to have a clandestine entrant in their vehicle. When I looked at this scheme in 2018, I found that no penalties had been imposed since July 2016. My report described the system as “broken” and in need of urgent attention. I recommended that the Home Office should fix the scheme so that penalties were issued wherever appropriate, and payment was pursued promptly. This recommendation was accepted. In 2019, I found that significant headway had been made with the backlog of referrals, but some cases had been waiting almost three years for a penalty notice to be imposed, calling into question the deterrent value of any eventual penalty. There was a problem with the resourcing of the team managing the scheme, and it did not have the IT it needed. At the time, Border Force indicated that it was aware of these issues and was already taking action to address them.
Given this history, it was all the more disappointing to find in this latest inspection that the team is still not staffed appropriately and does not have the systems required to run the scheme efficiently and effectively. This is despite the fact that the scope of the scheme was extended in 2023 to take in hauliers and lorry drivers who are found not to have secured their vehicles. At the same time, the penalties were substantially increased.
Even if income-generation is not its primary purpose, and the monies recovered are not wholly retained by the Home Office, it is hard to excuse the perennial under-investment in this area when the scheme has recovered over £10 million since the beginning of 2022, with another £26 million still to be recovered, albeit that some of this is uncollectible. If the Home Office is unwilling or unable to resource the scheme so that it works efficiently and effectively, ensuring that penalties are demonstrably consistent and fair, it should give serious consideration to reforming the scheme in line with the resources it is prepared to invest in it.
My report contains seven recommendations, covering: ‘ownership’ of clandestine entry and responsibility for ensuring that recommended improvements are implemented and embedded; an improved range of analyses, assessments and intelligence products to support decision-making about resources, investments and operational deployments; the provision of training to frontline Border Force officers to enable them to be used more flexibly; the installation of an integrated Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system linking the juxtaposed controls at Calais, Coquelles, and Dunkerque; a ‘root and branch’ review of the working practices and processes of the civil penalties team; production and publication of an ‘engagement plan’ for industry stakeholders; and publication of an annual report on how the scheme is working.
In its formal response, the Home Office has accepted two recommendations and partially accepted four. While I had hoped that the department might have shown more ambition in some areas, including in its timescales for implementing improvements, it has set out its thinking and what it intends to deliver in a way that will enable the ICIBI and others to measure its progress. Meanwhile, it has rejected my recommendation regarding an integrated ANPR system on grounds of cost versus likely benefits, which I understand, but which reinforces my view that it needs to become better at analysing what is working in order to inform investment decisions.
My report was sent to the Home Secretary on 4 February 2025, so its publication today is well within the target of eight weeks, which is encouraging. The published report contains a number of redacted passages. These redactions were made by the Home Secretary in line with the UK Borders Act 2007 which empowers her to omit material if she thinks its publication is undesirable for reasons of national security. In my view, the redactions do not affect understanding of the key findings and recommendations.
My principal concern going forward is that whatever improvements Border Force makes to its processes and practices as a result of this inspection these are banked and become ‘business as usual’, so that when the ICIBI comes to look at this area again it is not having to repeat the same points.
David Bolt, Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
25 March 2025
- An inspection of the Border Force operation to deter and detect clandestine entrants to the UK (August 2024 – November 2024)
- The Home Office responses to the Chief Inspector’s reports
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/inspection-report-published-an-inspection-of-the-border-force-operation-to-deter-and-detect-clandestine-entrants-to-the-uk-august-2024-november-202