U.S. Tightens Sanctions on Iran’s Oil Network
The Iranian regime continues to engage in destabilizing activities in the Middle East and beyond. Today, the United States is taking action under President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran to stem the flow of revenue that the regime uses to support its malign activities abroad and oppress its own people. The Department of State is imposing sanctions on four entities engaged in Iranian petroleum trade and is identifying two vessels as blocked property.
Today’s action includes the designation of a second China-based crude oil and petroleum products storage terminal that has a demonstrated pattern of violating U.S. sanctions on Iran. This terminal has acquired Iranian crude-oil at least nine times between 2021 and 2025, including from U.S. sanctioned vessels, amounting to the import of at least 13 million barrels of Iranian crude oil. Moreover, this terminal is directly connected to a major refinery complex in China, demonstrating the role that Chinese-based refiners continue to play in the purchase, acquisition, and processing of Iranian crude oil. This behavior continues to enable Iran’s ability to fund its nuclear escalations, support terrorist groups, and enable disruption of the flow of trade and freedom of navigation in waterways that are crucial to global prosperity and economic growth.
The Department of State is also designating three vessel management companies for their involvement in the transport of Iranian petroleum. Iran’s oil exports are enabled by a network of such illicit shipping facilitators in multiple jurisdictions who, through obfuscation and deception, load and transport Iranian oil for sale to buyers in Asia. The vessels managed by these companies have moved millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products and play a key role in the Iranian export supply chain.
These entities are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846 for having knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. GUANGSHA ZHOUSHAN ENERGY GROUP CO., LTD. (GUANGSHA ZHOUSHAN) owns and operates a crude oil and petroleum products terminal on Huangzeshan Island in Zhoushan, China. This terminal is directly connected through the Huangzeshan-Yushan Under Sea Oil Pipeline to a nearby teapot refinery.
GUANGSHA ZHOUSHAN, through its terminal on Huangzeshan Island, knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the acquisition of crude oil from Iran when the U.S.-designated tanker SNOW (IMO: 9569619), formerly known as CHERAM, linked to the U.S.-designated NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY, discharged Iranian crude oil at the terminal in August 2021. SNOW discharged approximately 2 million barrels of Iranian crude oil at the terminal operated by GUANGHSA ZHOUSHAN.
GUANGSHA ZHOUSHAN has also received Iranian crude oil on numerous other occasions. In February 2025, GUANGSHA ZHOUSHAN knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the acquisition of crude oil from Iran when the U.S.-designated tanker AVENTUS I (IMO: 9280873), also known as FURY, discharged approximately one million barrels of Iranian crude oil at its terminal.
GUANGSHA ZHOUSHAN is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.
Continued Targeting of Iran’s Ghost Fleet
The Department of State continues to designate vessel management companies and their tankers for knowingly engaging in the transportation of petroleum and petrochemical products from Iran. These vessel management companies and their associated tankers have collectively transported millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products, with the vast majority of the cargoes being delivered to buyers in China. Furthermore, these vessels have routinely engaged in “dark activity,” operating with their automatic identification system (AIS) location and identity beacon turned off. This behavior, which is designed to obscure the Iranian origin of the vessels’ cargoes, is a direct and unnecessary risk to other vessels as AIS is a key system used to avoid vessel collisions.
MARZIYA SHIPPING OPC PVT LTD (MARZIYA) is the technical/International Safety Management (ISM) manager of VIRGO (IMO: 9236250) since at least June 2021. RISING PHOENIX PROVIDER NV (PHOENIX) has been the commercial manager and registered owner of the VIRGO since at least November 2020. During their tenure as the ISM and commercial managers of VIRGO, respectively, VIRGO loaded approximately 22 million barrels of crude oil between 11 port calls at Kharg Island, Iran. VIRGO conducted these loadings between 2022 and 2024 while regularly engaging in “dark activity,” i.e. operating with its AIS location and identity beacon turned off. MARZIYA and PHOENIX are being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. VIRGO is being identified as property in which PHOENIX has an interest.
VALIANT MARINE VENTURES FZE (VALIANT) has been the commercial manager of AMOR (IMO: 9182291) since at least December 2021. AMOR loaded Iranian crude oil at Kharg Island, Lavan, and Sirri, Iran, at least fourteen times between January 2022 and January 2025, transporting over 20 million barrels of Iranian crude oil, while regularly conducting “dark activity” during its voyages. VALIANT is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. AMOR is being identified as property in which VALIANT has an interest.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, and in accordance with E.O. 13846, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all entities and individuals that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.
All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.
https://www.state.gov/sanctions-on-irans-oil-network-to-further-impose-maximum-pressure-on-iran/