AUKUS Nuclear Safeguards Statement to IAEA, March 2025
UK Ambassador Corinne Kitsell’s statement on behalf of Australia, the UK and the US to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting on IAEA safeguards and AUKUS
Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to disinformation about Australia’s acquisition of a naval nuclear propulsion capability through the AUKUS partnership. We are once again compelled to invoke our Right of Reply to address remarks that purposefully mischaracterise AUKUS and attempt to undermine the independence, integrity, and authority of the IAEA.
I reiterate that this item has not been adopted as a standing agenda item by this Board and has never enjoyed consensus support, despite one member state’s introduction every Board. This repeated attempt to add an agenda item distracts from other pressing concerns requiring the Board’s attention and falsely implies an active compliance problem where none exists. AUKUS partners will provide an update on Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under ‘Any Other Business’, consistent with our practice of providing updates to every regular meeting of the Board since 2021.
Director General Grossi has repeatedly expressed his satisfaction with AUKUS partners’ engagement and transparency and has upheld his commitment to update the Board on naval nuclear propulsion, including through his report published last November. Ever since the initial announcement of the partnership, the AUKUS partners have continued to engage consistently, openly, and transparently with Member States and the Secretariat on genuine questions.
Chair,
Under this item, the Board has repeatedly heard unsubstantiated claims that ignore or misrepresent the information we have provided in good faith, and assertions that disregard the statements made by the Director General. I would like to remind the Board that:
With regards to an intergovernmental dialogue, the IAEA has the clear authority under its Statute, and extensive precedent, to negotiate directly and in-confidence with individual Member States on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements. Interference would politicise the IAEA’s independence, its mandate and technical authority, and establish a deeply harmful precedent.
I also want to underline that the transfer of high enriched uranium from a nuclear-weapon State to a non-nuclear-weapon State does not run counter to the NPT or its spirit. The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level among States Parties is not prohibited by the NPT, provided the transfer is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine program will be subject to a robust package of verification measures, consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.
Naval nuclear propulsion was indeed foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement – on which Australia’s CSA is based – is the specific provision to support the right of states to use nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity, including for naval nuclear propulsion, within the legal framework for safeguards implementation.
As we have regularly stated, under Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material and meet its technical safeguards objectives throughout the submarines’ lifecycle. Once the Article 14 arrangement is agreed between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat, the Director General will transmit it to the Board for ‘appropriate action’. To suggest that the Board will somehow be bypassed is false.
With regards to the AUKUS Naval Nuclear Propulsion Agreement, I want to underline that it reaffirms, and is consistent with, the parties’ existing non-proliferation obligations, including under the NPT. The Agreement obliges the UK and US to ensure that Australia can provide the IAEA with other information and access necessary to fulfil Australia’s obligations under its safeguards agreements with the IAEA and the future Article 14 arrangement.
Chair,
Our three countries – along with the majority of the Board – continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item or any efforts that undermine and politicise the technical mandate of the IAEA. We appreciate that colleagues continue to reject deliberate attempts to undermine the Agency’s independence and integrity.
We will continue to engage in good faith with Member States on genuine questions. Consistent with our approach to maintaining open and transparent engagement, we will provide an update to the Board under ‘Any Other Business’ and welcome the Director General’s continued commitment to provide updates on naval nuclear propulsion, as and when he deems appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-safeguards-aukus-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-march-2025